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NOTES
unimpaired pursuit of lawful conduct. To prevent lawful
conduct under the guise of preserving peace and order is
altogether anomalous. It is to be hoped that the rule of this
case will be followed and extended.
CRIMINAL LAW
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL STATUTES CON-
TAINING NO REQUIREMENT OF MENS REA
A state embezzlement statute which dispenses with mens
real as a constituent of the crime is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, according to a recent decision of the Supreme
Court of New Mexico. State v. Prince, 189 P.2d 993 (N. M.
1948).
Defendant was charged in an information based upon a
New Mexico statute which reads: "Any person being in the
possession of the property of another, who shall convert such
property to his own use, or dispose of such property in any
way not authorized by the owner thereof, or by law, shall be
guilty of embezzlement .... -2 This statute expressly repealed
a prior embezzlement statute which had included nens rea as
a requisite of the crime.3
The trial court sustained a motion to quash the informa-
tion as unconstitutional and void, notwithstanding the fact
that the information did allege mens rea.4 Upon review by
writ of error, the New Mexico Supreme Court agreed with
the trial court that the statute upon which the information
was based was invalid. It was held that the statute consti-
tuted a denial of due process in that to make an "innocent"
act a crime is "inconsistent with law," and that the statute
1. As used throughout this note, the term mens rea is defined as
meaning the intentional or reckless doing of an act forbidden by
the criminal law, with knowledge of, or reckless disregard for,
the facts which make the act forbidden. Screws v. United States,
325 U. S. 91, 96 '(1945); Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246,
257 (1907); HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 138-168,
esp. 148-49 (1947).
2. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4519 (1941).
3. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 1543 (1915).
4. Courts frequently read the requirement of nens rea into statutes
which have omitted it. Cases cited notes 34, 35, and 36 infra.
When a statute is so construed, it is uniformly held that if the
indictment or information alleges mens rea, the charge is suffi-
cient. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S. 224 (1921).
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was "vague and indefinite." 5  However, the court further
held that the repealing clause of the invalid statute fell with
the rest, hence the prior embezzlement statute remained in
effect, and the case was reversed and remanded for trial
under the provisions of the old statute.
It is difficult to refrain from sympathizing with the
court in its zeal to hold invalid a statute under which it is pos-
sible to become criminally liable for an unintentional conver-
sion. Any adequate analysis of the ethical and policy consider-
ations involved in imposition of strict criminal liability is be-
yond the scope of this note. It is asserted as a general proposi-
tion, however, that statutory imposition of strict criminal lia-
bility is usually, if not always, unwise, often harsh, and be-
comes less defensible in proportion to the severity of the pen-
alty attached and to the degree of moral turpitude involved in
the intentional performance of the proscribed conduct.6 At
least one recognized authority in the field of criminal law
finds no rational basis for such liability7 Others find strict
criminal liability defensible only in the area of the so-called
public welfare and petty regulatory offenses where the penalty
does not exceed a fine.8
It is not, however, within the province of courts to in-
validate a statutory enactment merely because the statute is
an unwise one. No citation of authority is needed to support
the proposition that a state statute is valid unless it conflicts
with the state or federal constitution or with a valid act of
Congress.
In the instant case the court rests its decision entirely
5. Sadler, J., dissented on the ground that the requirement of tnens
rea should be read into the statute, and as thus interpreted the
statute should be sustained. Instant case at 997.
6. For two recent cases which illustrate the possible injustices which
may attend the enforcement of statutes eliminating mens rea, see
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943) and In re
Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525, 175 P.2d 832 (1946). Another striking
illustration is furnished by the case of Rex v. Larsonneur, 24 Cr.
App. R. 74 (1933), in which the defendant was convicted of violation
of the English immigration laws, even though she came into Eng-land by being bodily transported there against her will by Irish
officers who turned her over to the English police.
7. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 279-322, esp. 298-
308 (1947).
8. "There is nothing that need shock any mind in the payment of
a small pecuniary penalty by a person who has unwittingly done
something detrimental to the public interest. To subject him..
to penal servitude is a very different matter." Wills, J., in Reg.
v. Tolson, 23 Q. B. D. 168, 177 (1889). See also, Sayre, Public
Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L, REV. 55, 72-5, 78-84 (1933).
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upon a supposed conflict of the statute with the Federal Con-
stitution. Of course, no such specific limitation of state legis-
lative power is to be found in that instrument. If the limita-
tion exists, it must be found within the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. No philosophical discussion of
the content of the due process clause will be undertaken here.
However, in terms of what the present members of the
Supreme Court believe to be within and without the ambit of
"due process of law," some relevant and fairly definite obser-
vations may be made.
There is substantially complete agreement among the
present members of the court that the phrase "due process
of law" in and of itself guarantees a fair trial and the basic
procedural standards necessary to implement such a trial9
In addition to the guarantee of a fair trial, Justices Black
and Douglas believe that the due process clause imposes upon
the states all of the limitations imposed upon the federal
government by the first eight amendments, and imposes no
further limitations whatsoever10
Justices Murphy and Rutledge agree with Justices Black
and Douglas that the first eight amendments are imposed
upon the states, but believe further that there may be other
(undefined) "fundamental standards of procedure" which
may not be interfered with by state action despite the absence
of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights.1 It should be
9." . ... the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment-
just as that in the Fifth-has led few to doubt that it was in-
tended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appro-
priate, then and hereafter, to protect at all times, people charged
with or suspected of crime by those holding positions of power
and authority... no man's life, liberty or property may be for-
feited as criminal punishment . . * until there [has] been a charge
fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of preiudice,
passion, excitement and tyrannical power." Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227, 236-37 (1940). "This requirement-of conforming
to fundamental standards of procedure in criminal trials-was
made operative against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 238. "A right to a fair trial is a right admittedly pro-
tected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 53 (1947). "The hearing,
moreover, must be a real one, not a sham or a pretense." Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 327 (1937).
10. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Black in Adamson v. California, 332
U. S. 46, 68 et seq. (1947); Comments, 33 IowA L. J. 668 (1948)
and 46 MIcH. L. REV. 372 (1948). The process whereby these
two Justices rationalize their position in holding "vague and in-
definite" statutes invalid is not, however, entirely clear. See
note 23 infra.
11. See Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting for himself and Rutledge, J.,
in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 124 (1947).
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observed that the four Justices heretofore mentioned are those
who are generally most sensitive and alert to claimed infringe-
ment of personal liberties.12
The other five members of the Court do not believe that
all of the first eight amendments are imposed upon the states.' s
State legislatures may not interefere (outside certain narrow
limits) -with freedom of speech, thought, the press, and peace-
ful assembly, 4 but may impose double jeopardy,15 dispense
with indictment by grand jury,16 modify or abolish trial by
jury,1 and compel the accused in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself.' s Due process of law restrains a
state from interfering with those rights which are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty"; from violating a "principle
of justice so deeply rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental"; from disregard-
ing those "immutable principles of justice which inhere in
the very idea of free government"; whether or not such re-
straints are specifically enunciated in the Bill of Rights.:9
In addition to the views as above expressed, it appears
12. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1946-47, 15 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 1, 20-22 (1947).
13. See the opinion of the Court, per Reed, J., in Adamson v. Califor-
nia, 332 U. S. 46 (1947), and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion, id. at 59.
14. W. Va. State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624
(1943); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Lovell v.
Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
(1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 326-7 (1937). It is to be noted, how-
ever, that even these freedoms are not absolute, and may, to an
extent, be limited by the state in the due exercise of its police
power. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249
U. S. 47 (1919). See Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting for him-
self, Roberts, and Reed, JJ., in W. Va. State Board of Education
v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 646 (1943).
15. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
16. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884); Gaines v. Washing-
ton, 277 U. S. 81, 86 (1928).
17. Wagner Electric Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U. S. 226 (1923); New York
Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U. S. 581 (1900); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875).
18. Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).
19. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937); Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 101-2 (1908). In Adamson v. California,
322 U. S. 46 (1947), four of these five Justices specifically ap-
proved the doctrine of the Palko case, while Mr. Justice Frank-
furter rested his concurring opinion entirely upon the Twining
case.
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probable that a majority of the present membership of the
Court believe that the due process clauses give the Court
power to invalidate state and federal legislation which in the
opinion of the Court constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable
interference with personal liberty and which has no rational
relationship to protection of the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare.20 Only Justices Black and Douglas def-
initely oppose the test of constitutionality as thus expressed.21
Applying these various attitudes to the facts of the
principal case, is a state embezzlement statute which dispenses
with mens rea a deprivation of due process of law? Even
were the question an entirely open one, the result would
appear to be by no means certain. In order to convince a
majority of the present Court, it would be necessary to per-
suade at least one Justice from among Vinson, Frankfurter,
Reed, Jackson, and Burton that freedom from strict criminal
liability is a "principle of justice [more deeply] rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people" than are, for ex-
ample, freedom from double jeopardy and trial by jury; or
else that such liability constitutes an unreasonable or arbi-
trary interference with personal liberty which has no rational
relation to protection of the public health, safety, morals or
welfare. Justices Black and Douglas would have to be shown
that strict criminal liability is incompatible with the basic
procedural standards necessary to implement a fair trial, or
20. Federal Power Comission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S.
586, 599 (1942); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S.
144, 152 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379,
398 (1937). There is, however, a judicial presumption of the
existence of facts to support the rationality of the legislativejudgment. United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra at 152,
esp. footnote 4. While the "arbitrary" or "unreasonable" test is
generally applied by the Court in the field of freedom of con-
tract (cases cited supra), the language has been used in at least
one civil rights case. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 257
(1936).
21. See Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ., concurring in Federal
Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 599
(1942) ; Mr. Justice Black's concurrence in United States v. Caro-
lene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 155 (1938); Mr. Justice Black
dissenting for himself and Douglas, J., in Adamson v. California,
322 U. S. 46, 68 et seq. (1947). Mr. Justice Murphy seems in
substantial agreement with Justices Black and Douglas in their
views on this point in respect to "freedom of contract," but his
dissent in Adamson v. California, supra at 124, makes it appear
doubtful whether he consistently carries over the same view into
the field of other personal rights. Mr. Justice Rutedge's posi-
tion is similarly in doubt in view of his joining in Mr. Justice
Murphy's dissent in the Adamson case.
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else that such liability falls within the proscription of the
Sixth Amendment in that it would tend to make a farce of
trial by jury by taking away an essential issue of fact from
the jury.22 It is believed that only Justices Murphy and
Rutledge could be counted upon with some confidence to hold
such a statute unconstitutional. While the prospect of con-
vincing enough of the others to constitute a majority is far
from hopeless, neither is it bright.23
22. In State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 128, 110 Pac. 1027 (1910), for
this reason, among others, a state statute abolishing the defense
of insanity was held unconstitutional. The basic problem in-
volved in such a statute is essentially the same as m a statute
dispensing with mens rea. For a strongly adverse criticism of
the Strasburg case, see Rood, Statutory Abolition of the Defense
of Insanity in Criminal Cases, 9 MIcH. L. REv. 126 (1910).
23. That the task is not hopeless, witness the fact that the entire
present membership of the Court have been able to fit into their
respective constitutional philosophies the doctrine that a statute
is unconstitutional under the due process clause if it is so vague
and indefinite that a man of ordinary intelligence cannot tell
what conduct is proscribed by it. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S.
507 (1948) (Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissented,
but, semble, only upon the ground that the particular statute in-
volved was not objectionable); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 3116 U. S.
451 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242 (1935). See note
on the Winters case, 23 IND. L. J. 272 (1948). As developed at
greater length further in this note, vague statutes are somewhat
similar, in terms of effect, to statutes, which omit mens rea. In
either instance, criminal liability would be possible notwithstanding
the exercise of the highest degree of care. It should be further
noted that legislative enactment of vague statutes is not, in terms,
forbidden by the Bill of Rights. Yet even Justices Black and
Douglas adhere to the "void for vagueness" doctrine, even though
they believe that the Court's power to veto legislation on due
process prounds is most severely limited outside the area covered
by the Bill of Rights, unless the statute violates "procedural" due
process, i.e., tends to deprive of a fair trial. It is believed that
Justices Black and Douglas, at least, do rationalize their adher-
ence to the "void for vagueness" doctrine in terms of "procedural"
due process. Prosecution under a vague statute smacks strongly
of ex post facto liability, and Mr. Justice Black indicates in
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 236 (1940), that a trial under
an ex post facto law would be a farce. And in the Winters case,
333 U. S. 507 at 510, the statute was held invalid in terms of "pro-
cedural" due process. From the foregoing it appears possible
that any member of the present Court might, consistently with
his constitutional philosophy, find a rationalization for the invalida-
tion of strict criminal liability statutes. But speaking of strict
criminal liability for the Court in United States v. Dotterweich,
320 U. S. 277, 280 (1943), Mr. Justice Black said: "Such legisla-
tion dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal con-
duct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting upon a person otl-erwie inno-
cent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."
And, id. at 285: "Our system of criminal justice necesqarily
depends on conscience and circumspection in prosecuting officers
... even when the consequences are far more drastic than they
are under the provisions of the law before us."
[VoI. 24
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But the question is not entirely an open one. In United
States v. Balint,24 Chief Justice Taft, speaking for a unani-
mous Court, held constitutional a federal statute which im-
posed strict criminal liability for violation of the Federal
Anti-Narcotic Act. Conviction under the statute carried with
it a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment. While
the question has not since been up for full review and reexam-
ination, the Balint case has recently been cited as settled law
by the Supreme Court without any attempt to limit the scope
of its doctrine.
25
It i% obviously too broad a statement to say that the
Balint case definitely stands for the proposition that it is
within the legislative power to eliminate mens rea from any
and all crimes. There is, however, language in the opinion in
that case asserting the legislative power in general terms,
without any attempt to limit or qualify the scope of that
power.26  Nevertheless, there was no affirmative indication
that the Court was thinking in terms of the traditional crimes,
and there was language implying that the legislative power to
eliminate mens rea might not be plenary.27
24. 258 U. S. 250 (1922).
25. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). Mr. Justice
Murphy dissented in the Dotterweich case, for himself, Roberts,
Reed, and Rutledge, JJ. But the dissent specifically admitted the
legislative power and based the dissent solely upon interpretation
of the statute. " . . in the absence of clear statutory authoriza-
tion it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to
rest liability on an act in which the accused did not participate
and of which he had no personal knowledge." [Italics supplied.]
Mr. Justice Murphy dissenting in United States v. Dotterweich,
supra at 286. In the forty-odd other cases, state and federal, in
which the Balint case has been cited, none have attempted to
limit the scope of its holding in respect to legislative power. One
case did find mens rea to be a "necessary" element of the crime
of embezzlement, but the court in that case was talking* in terms
of legislative intent, not legislative power. The requirement of
mens rea was then "read into" the statute, and the statute, as
thus construed, held valid. Mackey v. United States, 290 Fed. 18
(C. C. A. 6th 1923).
26. "It has been objected that punishment of a person for an act in
violation of law when ignorant of the facts making it so, is an
absence of due process of law. But that objection is considered
and overruled in Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57,
69, 70, (1910) in which it was held that in the prohibition or pun-
ishment of particular acts, the State may in the maintenance of
public policy provide 'that he who shall do them shall do them
at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith
or ignorance.' " United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 252 (1922).
"The question before us, therefore, is one of the construction of
the statute and of inference of the intent of Congress." Id. at 253
27. "While the general rule at common law was that scienter was a
19481
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Without speculating further upon the full breadth of the
doctrine of the Balint case, it is certain that that case does
stand for the proposition that the legislature has the power
in some instances to dispense with mens rea as a constituent
of a crime. Unless the Balint case, upon its facts, can be
validly distinguished from the instant case, the New Mexico
court has adopted the anomalous position that the Federal
Constitution precludes a state legislature from doing that
which the Supreme Court Has expressly declared to be within
the legislative power.
A court, intent upon distinguishing the two cases, would
experience little difficulty in finding apt judicial language
upon which to hang such a distinction. Whether the dis-
tinction would be a valid one is yet to be considered.
Conviction under the New Mexico embezzlement statute
carried with it a maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment.
The maximum penalty possible in the Balint case was five
years. It seems unlikely, however, that any court would care
to assert that, in terms of legislative power, the cases are
distinguishable in this respect.2 8
necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime,
and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where
the statutory definition did not in terms include it . . . there
has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions
under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by
such requirements." United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 251-52 (1922). "Many instances of [elimination of vwns rea] are to
be found in regulatcry measures . . . where the emphasis of the
statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment
rather than the punishment of crimes as in cases of mala in se."
Id. at 252.
28. For other cases upholding strict liability statutes under which
substantial maximum terms of imprisonment were possible, see
United States v. Greenbaum, 138 F.2d 437 (C. C. A. 3rd 1943) -(introducing adulterated food into interstate commerce; 1 yr.);
United States v. Coombs, 73 F. Supp. 813 (E. D. Ky. 1947) (resist-
ing federal officers; 10 yrs.); In re Marley, 29 Cal.2d 525, 175
P.2d 832 (1946) (employer made liable for giving of short
weight by employee; 6 mo.); People v. Wahl, 39 Cal. 771, 100
P.2d 550 (1940) (misleading advertisement; 6 Mo.); State v.
Dobry, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N. W. 702 (1933) (violation of state
Blue Sky laws; 5 yrs.); Hunter v. State, 158 Tenn. 63, 12 S. W.2d
361 (1928) (embezzlement, mostly dicta; 20 yrs.); Pappas v.
State, 135 Tenn. 499, 188 S. W. 52 (1916) (removal of mortgaged
property from state; 5 yrs.); State v. Lindberg, 125 Wash. 51,
215 Pac. 41 (1923) (violation of state banking act, in that de-
fendant borrowed money from a bank of which he was a director;10 yrs. Note that the absence of mens rea here is largely illusory,
for it is almost inconceivable that one could inadvertently borrow
money from a bank.); Boyd v. State, 217 Wis. 149, 258 N. W. 330(1935) (violation of state Blue Sky laws; 5 yrs.).
[Vol. 24
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Courts often draw a distinction between crimes mala in
se and those mala prohibita. It is often asserted that mens
rea is a necessary element in crimes of the former type, but
not of the latter.29 It is quite possible that a court might be
prevailed upon to hold that the Balint case stands only for
the proposition that the legislature has constitutional power
to eliminate mens rea from crimes rala prohibita, and that
the constitutional power does not extend to crimes mala in se.
From a critical standpoint, it is submitted that the
mala in se-mala prohibita classification is neither a logically
possible nor a valid one.30 Assuming, however, that the conduct
involved in the sale of narcotics is not "bad in itself," it seems
to be a clearly absurd proposition to assert that it is within
the legislative power to imprison a man for five years for
unintentional performance of conduct not "bad in itself," but
that it is outside the legislative power to imprison a man for
unintentional performance of conduct which is "bad in itself."
It is true that the Balint case dealt with a so-called "public
welfare" offense, and it may be contended that the Constitu-
tion dictates a different result in a case involving one of the
traditional crimes. The great mass of strict criminal liability
statutes are found in the field of "public welfare" offenses. 31
But in a very real sense, all criminal statutes are directed
.toward protection of the public welfare. In the crimes usually
classified as public welfare offenses, the objects of protection
29. E.g., Landen v. United States, 299 Fed. 75, 88 (C. C. A. 6th 1924);
Mackey v. United States, 290 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 6th 1923); People
v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 445, 123 N. E. 543, 545 (1919); People v.
D'Antonio, 134 N. Y. Supp. 557, 659-61 (1912). See HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 292-93. 1947).
30. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 292-98 (1947); cf.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55, 70-71 (1933).
31. See United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250, 252 (1922), and cases
there cited; HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 281-86
(1947); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55
(1933). However, strict criminal liability, as it exists today, is
by no means confined to "public welfare" offenses. Cases cited note
28 supra. Such liability is often imposed in sex offenses, notably
statutory rape, bigamy, and adultery. People v. Dolan, 96 Cal.
315, 31 Pac. 107 (1892); Ellison v. State, 100 Fla. 737, 129 So.
887 (1930); Heath v. State, 173 Ind. 296, 90 N. E. 310 (1910);
State v. Ruhl, 8 Iowa 447 (1859); Cornett v. Commonwealth, 134
Ky. 613, 121 S. W. 424 (1909) ; People v. Marks, 146 N. Y. App. 11,
130 N. Y. Supp. 524 (1911); State v. Ackerly, 79 Vt. 69, 64 Atl.
450 (1906); cf. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945);
State v. Woods, 107 Vt. 354, 179 Atl. 1 (1935). The leading Eng-
lish case is Reg. v. Prince, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154 (1875). And the
felony-murder, misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrines present a
closely related problem. See HALL, op. cit. supra, 280.
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are the public health and morals. In the traditional crimes
the objective is generally protection of life and property. It
is a logically possible conclusion that some line can be drawn
here, that the constitutional power of a legislature exercised
in the protection of health and morals is greater than is the
power to protect life and property.
It seems hardly credible, however, that any such elusive
distinction was envisioned by the drafters of the Constitution
and the Amendments. Nor does it seem likely that courts
would find the arbitrary creation of such a distinction either
justifiable or practicable. If the legislature can constitution-
ally dispense with mens rea in framing a statute to protect
the public from the sale of narcotics, no sufficient constitu-
tional reason appears why the same legislative power does not
exist in protecting the public from the conduct entailed in the
crime of embezzlement. The Balint case may be wrong, but
it is not validly distinguishable, either logically or ethically,
from the instant case.
Faced with this "state of the law," the New Mexico court
solved the dilemma by failing to mention the Balint case, and
by placing the emphasis of its opinion upon the grounds that
the statute was void for vagueness, a doctrine which at pres-
ent is well recognized by the Supreme Court.3 2 A fair state-
ment of this doctrine is that when the standard of conduct
laid down by a penal statute is so indefinite that a man of
ordinary intelligence cannot determine beforehand what con-
duct is prohibited, then the statute is repugnant to the due
process clause. 33
In the instant case, however, the standard of conduct is
defined by the statute wifh unusual clarity. If language is
ever capable of having objective meaning, then the conduct
prohibited by this statute must be clear to a man of even
less-than-ordinary intelligence. Only by Humpty Dumpty's
standards is the language of the statute open to the objection
of vagueness. In short, if the statute is vague, it is so be-
cause and only because the element of intent is omitted
from the definition of the crime. The opinion in the instant
32. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507 (1948); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U. S. 451 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
(1936); Note 23 IND. L. J. 272 (1948).
33. Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 518, 519-20 (1948); Lan-
zetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453 (1939); Connally v. General
Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 (1926).
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case tacitly admits that this is the court's position, and the
language of the statute and of the opinion admit of no other
interpretation.
In one sense, however, the court's novel position on the
vagueness point has some merit. In terms of effect, a crim-
inal statute in which the standard of conduct is vaguely and
indefinitely defined is quite similar to one which dispenses
with mens rea as an element of a crime. In the first in-
stance, a man of ordinary intelligence cannot ascertain what
conduct is forbidden; in the latter instance a man may run
afoul of the law because of unavoidable accident or because
he is physically or mentally unable to comply with the stan-
dard of conduct laid down by the statute. In either case, the
effect of the statute is to make possible criminal liability
which cannot be avoided by exercise of the highest degree of
care. Thus, speaking from a critical point of view and escap-
ing for the moment from the tyranny of words, it might be
validly asserted that a court should reach the same result in
passing upon the constitutionality of either type of statute.
In the face of the Balint case, however, the position of
the New Mexico court on the vagueness point cannot be sup-
ported. As stated above, the Balint case stands for the con-
stitutional proposition that, at least in some areas of conduct,
a legislature may prescribe punishment without mens rea. It
is a manifest absurdity to assert the proposition that a legis-
lature has the constitutional power to punish certain conduct
without mens rea, but that an attempt to exercise the power
is unconstitutional because it makes the statute "void for
vagueness." Whatever else the doctrine of "void for vague-
ness" may mean, it does not mean that an otherwise valid
criminal statute becomes invalid by elimination of the require-
ment of mens rea.
The courts have usually been vigilant to resist the statu-
tory imposition of strict criminal liability, and this judicial
resistance has generally increased in direct proportion to the
severity of the punishment imposed and the degree of moral
turpitude involved in the offense. Two main tools have long
been used by courts in this connection. In England, where
the legislative power is avowedly not directly subject to judi-
cial limitation, the device resorted to has been that of statu-
tory interpretation, i.e., the "reading into" the statute of the
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requirement of mens rea. The leading English cases in point
are Reg. v. Tolson34 and Reg. v. Sleep
5
The courts of this country have used the same device, 0
but have also had available for experiment the additional tool
of limitation of legislative power by constitutions, state and
federal. A substantial body of case law has been written to
the effect that the enactment of strict criminal liability, espe-
cially in the so-called malum in se area of conduct, is outside
the scope of legislative power.3 7  Such results are neither sur-
prising nor difficult to reach under the "substantive due pro-
cess" theory that the guarantee of an undetermined number
of substantive "natural law" rights is incorporated into the
various constitutions by virtue of the due process clauses.
Since the decision in the Balint case, however, and with the
recent decline of the doctrine of substantive due process, 38 the
34. 23 Q. B. D. 168 (1889).
35. Le. & Ca. 44, 169 Eng. Rep. 1296 (1861). Other and more recent
English and Dominion cases of the line to which the Tolson and
Sleep cases belong are Brend v. Wood, 62 T. L. R. 462 (1946); Rex
v. Turnbull, 44 S. R. (N. S. W.) 108, 61 W. N. (N. W. S.) 70 (1943) ;
Sherras v. de Rutzen, [1895] 1 Q. B. 918. There is, however, an-
other line of English cases contra, in spirit at least, to the Tolson
line. Rex v. Larsonneur, 24 Cr. App. R. 542 (1933); Parker v.
Alder, [1899] 1 Q. B. 20; Reg. v. Bishop, 5 Q. B. D. 259 (1880);
Reg. v. Prince, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154 (1875. For a brief general dis-
cussion of these two lines of cases, see Notes, 63 L. Q. REv. 9
(1947) and 96 L. J. 399 (1946).
36. E.g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U. S. 224 (1921); Nigro v. United
States, 4 F.2d 781 (C. C. A. 8th 1925); Mackey v. United States,
290 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 6th 1923) ; People v. Clark, 242 N. Y. 313, 151
N. E. 631 (1926); State v. Great A&P Tea Co., 111 W. Va. 148,
161 S. E. 5 (1931). But see State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio App. 91,
96-7, 55 N. E.2d 870, 872 (1943).
37. Kilbourne v. State, 84 Ohio St. 247, 95 N. E. 824 (1911); cf. State
v. Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 Pac. 1027 (1910). Surprisingly
enough, however, few direct holdings to that effect are to be
found, and most of the "authority" is dictum or by implication.
See State v. Laundy, 103 Ore. 443, 204 Pac. 958, 976-7 (1922);
People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442, 445, 123 N. E. 543, 545 (1919).
Raylin and Tuttle, Due Process and Punishment, 20 MICH. L.
REv. 614 (1922), made a strong and cogent argument that strict
criminal liability statutes were unconstitutional. The next month,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Balint case.
38. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575
(1942); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941); United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937). See Mr. Justice Black dis-
senting in Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68 (1947), and
concurring in Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas, etc., supra
at 599 and in United States v. Carolene Products Co., supra at
155. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring in Adamson v.
California, supra at 59, and dissenting in W. Va. State Board of
Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 646 (1943).
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legislative power to exclude mens rea as a requisite of a crime
has been questioned with less frequency by the courts on
constitutional grounds.3 9
The instant case is not, perhaps, so remarkable for the
result it reached as it is for the fact that the decision was
based solely on the federal Constitution in the face of United
States Supreme Court decisions which, if not squarely contra,
at least indicated an opposite result.40 So long as the Balint
case stands, it seems highly doubtful that a state court can,
with propriety, hold that the Federal Constitution invalidates
a statute imposing strict criminal liability, unless there is a
more valid ground of distinction than appears in the instant
case.
It is not unlikely, however, that a state court may be
prevailed upon to hold that the due process clause (or some
other provision) of its state constitution places a greater
limitation upon legislative power than does either the Fifth
of Fourteenth Amendment. Such a device has been resorted
to upon several occasions.4 1 In the instant case no reference
39. The instant case is the only one found in which such a statute has
been invalidated solely upon the ground that it violated the federal
Constitution. In Ex parte Bales, 42 Okla. Cr. 28, 274 Pac. 485
(1929), the statute (murder) was held "unconstitutional," but the
court did not specify under which constitution. In the Bales case,
as in the instant one, the statute was also held void for vagueness.
The statute involved in that case was, perhaps, more vulnerable
to that objection than was the one in the instant case. In
People v. Estreich, 75 N. Y. S.2d 267 (App. Div. 2d. Dep't 1947),
a receiving stolen property statute which omitted mens r'ea was
held to violate both the state and federal constitutions. It should
be noted, however, that the opinion in the Estreich case, while
not entirely clear, was based at least partly upon the ground ihat
the statute constituted "an illegal and arbitrary interference with
a lawful business." Id. at 270. It is also interesting to note
that the Balint case was decided in 1922 when the doctrine of
substantive due process was near the peak of its prestige. It is,
perhaps, a sad commentary upon the history of "due process of
law" that during the period when a majority of the Supreme
Court found so much constitutional protection accorded by that
phrase to "freedom of contract," e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospi-
tal, 261 U. S. 525 (1923), no such protection was found for free-
dom from imprisonment for nonculpable conduct.
40. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U. S. 277 (1943); United States
v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (1922) ; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota,
218 U. S. 57 (1910).
41. Compare Boomer v. Olsen, 143 Neb. 579, 10 N. W.2d 507 (1943),
and State Board of Barber Examiners v. Cloud, 220 Ind. 552, 44
N. E.2d 972 (1942) z with Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U. S. 236 (1941),
and Nebbia v. New York, 291 U .S. 502 (1934). Compare Illinois
Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm., 387 Ill. 256, 56 N. E.2d
432 (1944), with Federal Power Comm. v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942). Compare Cincinnati v. Correll, 141
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was made to the state constitution, although the New Mexico
constitution does contain a due process clause. 42
While overthrow of the Balint case during the tenure of
the present membership of the Supreme Court does not seem
extremely hopeful, such a possibility cannot be overlooked.43
Meanwhile the courts can and should combat omissions of
mens rea from criminal statutes by reading the requirement
of mens rea into such statutes in the absence of a clear show-
ing that to do so would be contrary to legislative purpose.44
Ohio 535, 49 N. E.2d 412 (1943), with West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937).
42. N. M. Const. Art. II, § 18.
43. See note 23 supra.
44. Such was the position advocated by the dissenting justice in the
instant case: "It convicts the legislature of sheer stupidity to
hold that in enacting [the statute] it intended to authorize pun-
ishment of the innocent and well intentioned along with the venal
and criminally disposed. The element of fraudulent intent neces-
sarily is to be read into the statute and as so construed, it is per-
fectly valid." Sadler, J., dissenting in the instant ease at 997.
The majority felt themselves precluded from so holding for the
reason that "When in any enactment there appears an express
modification . . . of certain provisions in the former enactment,
such express modification . . . will be held to disclose the full
intent of the framers of the latter enactment ... " Instant case
at 995. But in a similar case, the United States Supreme Court
has found no such difficulty to exist. Baender v. Barnett, 255
U. S. 224 (1921).
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